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This thesis explores the prospects for a U .S./Brazilian naval 
partnership for the twenty-first century. It examines the viability of 
existing multilateral agreements between the United States and Latin 
American countries for maritime defense of the South Atlantic. It 
argues that the existing agreements are outdated and ineffective, 
primarily due to a reduction in cold war threat. With· a naval 
capability ranked among the highest in the third world, and 
historical naval ties to the United States from both World Wars, the 
Brazilian navy offers the possibility to assume a greater role in 
western defense. As a possible means to cultivate this beneficial 
relationship, a shift in emphasis from the current posture . of 
U .S.lLatin American multilateral hemispheric defense, to a focused 
bilateral U.S./Brazilian naval partnership is suggested. 
The thesis also suggests that national security threats to the 
hemisphere have changed to terrorism, narco-trafficking, the spread 
of high technology weapons, and the rIse of ethnic tensions. These 
, i 
threats affect both the United States and Brazil, and could lead to 
closer cooperation in U.S./Brazilian naval relations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the early 1980's, President Ronald Reagan suggested a mutual 
security arrangement between Brazil and the United States'! The 
idea was never acted upon due to Brazilian disinterest. This thesis 
will analyze the plausibility of such an arrangement in today's 
international system with regard to a regional maritime defense of 
the South Atlantic. In order to do so, the changing global community 
and nature of security alliances must first be examined. 
Of primary importance is an accurate assessment of threat to the 
region. To some, revelations of a Soviet economy with zero or even 
negative growth in 1990, claims of sovereignty by fourteen of the 
fifteen republics, Gorbachev's declining popularity at home, low 
morale and poor living conditions all appear to give credence to the 
argument that the United States can afford to disarm and enJoy a 
"peace dividend." 
There are loud voices In the U.S. Congress calling for huge 
defense budget cuts, and the effects of these are already being felt. 
Indeed, the international system is changing and for the time being, 
East-West frictions appear to be at their lowest level since World 
War II. This, however, does not necessarily mean that the United 
States can demobilize. Other problems in the world system are 
gaining increasing prominence. Terrorism, narco-trafficking, the 
1 Brazil: A Country Study, United States Government as represented by the 
Secretary of the Army, 1983, p. 282. 
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spread of high technology conventional and nuclear weapons to the 
developing world, and the rise of ethnic tensions worldwide are 
filling any gap that the declining Soviet threat may have created. 
The recent Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and concomitant United States 
response serve to underscore the endless volatility in the Middle 
East. And despite the perception of a decreased Soviet threat, the 
Soviet Union continues to modernize its armed forces, to engage in 
international intelligence gathering, to support regimes hostile to the 
United States, and is still the most potent threat to the existence of 
the United States, even without its Warsaw Pact allies.2 
Some have suggested that the United States' widening defense 
resource gap could be filled by increased burden sharing of its 
allies. 3 Would a cutback in the U.S. Navy's budget prevent adequate 
coverage of the South Atlantic in time of war, and if so, could this 
coverage be assumed or augmented by a capable ally such as Brazil? 
Political Scientist Philip Kelly made the following comment in his 
book, Geopolitics of the Southern Cone and Antarctica: 
From a geopolitical standpoint, it is sV'~rising that the United 
States does not forge closer strategic linkages with Brazil. The two 
nations are natural allies in the sense that their spheres of 
influence do not overlap, they share similar foreign policy 
traditions (neither condone extracontinental intrusions into 
America that might destabilize frontiers), they occupy continental 
2Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost USN, "Maritime Strategy for the 1990's", U.S. Naval 
Institute Proceedings, May 1990, p. 98. 
3 Among them, President Bush in the 1990 National Security Strategy of the 
United States. p. 3. 
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locations peripheral to Eurasia, and their diplomatic heritages are 
American, Western, pacific and commercia1.4 
A. WHY A NAVAL PARTNERSHIP, AND WHY WITH BRAZIL? 
What exactly is meant by the term "naval partnership," and why 
a naval partnership instead of a full blown joint military alliance or 
some other type of mutual security arrangement with Brazil? The 
following definitions are provided in order to better understand the 
nature of international partnerships: 
-Alliances--multilateral agreements between two or more states 
made to improve their power position for the purpose of 
defending common interests.s Treaties are written to formalize 
alliances, however not all alliances are spelled out in treaties. 
Some alliances are forged under the aegis of executive 
agreements. 
-Treaties--formal agreements entered into between two or more 
states for the purpose of defining or limiting mutual rights and 
responsibilities. 6 Treaties must be approved by two thirds vote in 
the Senate, and require Presidential ratification. 
-Executive agreements--international agreements between the 
President of the United States and foreign heads of state. 
Executive agreements are less formal than treaties and do not 
require Senate consent.? 
Alliances are formed either for economic reasons (as in the case 
of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries [OPEC]), or for 
4Philip Kelly and Jack Child, eds. Geopolitics of the Southern Cone and 
Antarctica (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988), p. 114. 
SJack Plano, Milton Greenberg, The American Political Dictionary, (Hinsdale: 
The Dryden Press, 1979), p. 379. 
6Plano and Greenberg, The American Political Dictionary, p. 410. 
?Plano and Greenberg, The American Political Dictionary, p. 389. 
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national security reasons (as in the case of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization [NATO]). National security alliances will henceforth be 
referred to as military alliances. The following definitions are useful 
when discussing military alliances: 
·Combined operations--military operations in which U.S. forces 
act in concert with foreign allied forces (also called force 
integration).S 
·Joint operations--military operations in which U.S. alI, land and 
naval forces act in concert with one another.9 
The term "naval partnership" as it is used here refers to a 
military alliance between the United states and Brazil, involving 
force integration between the navies of each country. This naval 
partnership is not "joint" in the traditional sense because it involves 
only the navies of each country (and the maritime component of the 
Brazilian air force). The navy was chosen because as a maritime 
nation, much of Brazil's national and economic security hinges on its 
ability to maintain open sea lines of communication. It is for this 
reason that Brazil currently possesses a navy that is ranked among 
the top three in the third world based on capability.1 ° Similarly, the 
United States, as a two-ocean nation is dependent on a strong navy to 
SChief of Naval Operations, The Maritime Strategy, OPNAV 60 P-1-89, 
Department of the Navy, Revision 4, 23 February 1989, pp. 8, 19. 
9Chief of Naval Operations, The Maritime Strategy, OPNAV 60 P-1-89, 
Department of the Navy, Revision 4, 23 February 1989, pp. 8, 19. 
lOMichael A. Morris, Expansion of Third World Navies, (London: MacMillan 
Press, 1987), pp. 25, 26. 
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protect its overseas interests as well as to ensure freedom of the seas 
for its commerce and to promote the free passage of strategic raw 
materials. The two countries have similar needs in this regard, 
although the United States as a superpower has maritime interests of 
a much larger scope. 
There are other factors which make Brazil a logical choice for a 
naval partner. Brazil was the only Latin American country to declare 
war on the Central powers in World War I, and it fought alongside 
the United States in World War II. In addition, the Brazilian arms 
industry has been among the largest in the third world, giving Brazil 
some capability to modernize forces with its own military industrial 
complex. 
A naval partnership between the two countries could be 
mutually beneficial, not only for present security considerations, but 
for other reasons as well. The enhanced power status and prestige 
accorded to Brazil from working closely with a recognized world 
power could create an atmosphere of respect and cooperation leading 
to the following positive developments for both countries: 
·A partnership formulated and strengthened now could be useful 
in the event of a future threat to the Western hemisphere, or 
provide a basis for future Brazilian military support in crises such 
as the 1990-1991 Middle East crisis. 
·A defensive partnership could promote better relations between 
the two countries and provide some common ground in 
cooperative experience which is presently missing. A partnership 
could give the United States a bigger "foot in the door" to better 
5 
B. 
address and cooperate on problems such as narco-terrorism, debt 
reduction, and environmental concerns. 
·A partnership could be seen by neighboring countries as a 
positive North/South development which would serve to diffuse 
the "anti-Yankeeism" attitudes of many Latin Americans. 
FORMULA FOR VIABLE ALLIANCE: A HYPOTHESIS 
TESTING MATRIX 
Before a naval partnership can be considered, the determinants 
of a viable alliance must first be investigated. K. J. Holsti asserts that 
military alliances can be classified and compared according to the 
nature of the casus foederis (the catalyst for action), the type of 
action to be taken in the event of this catalyst, whether or not 
combined operations are to be used, and the geographical scope of 
the alliance. 1 1 
Holsti goes on to describe four sources of conflict which may 
arise among the members of an alliance and may weaken its 
viability. These include the development of diverging objectives, the 
development of a threat against only one or a few of the partners 
within the alliance, incompatibility of social and political values, and 
the development of nuclear weapons by one or more members of the 
alliance. 1 2 
These terms are explained below: 13 
11 K. J. Holsti, International Politics, A Framework for Analysis, (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1988) pp. 103-107. 
12Holsti, International Politics, A Framework for Analysis, pp. 107--110. 
13Explanation of tenns from Holsti, pp. 103--107. 
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1. Casus Foederis 
The casus foederis is the catalyst required for mutual 
commitments to become operational. Usually, the more precisely the 
casus foederis is defined, the more viable the alliance is, however 
this is not always the case. An example of a treaty with a vague 
casus foederis IS the 1939 German-Italian "Pact of Steel" which 
stated: 
If it should happen, against the wishes and hopes of the 
contracting parties, that one of them should become involved in 
warlike complications . . . the other contracting party will come to 
its aid as an ally and will support it with all its military forces. 14 
The wording "warlike complications" was so vague and 
general that Italy was committed to assist Hitler in almost any 
situation. A vaguely worded casus foederis IS often times 
characteristic of an offensive alliance as opposed to a defensive one. 
In a defensive alliance, a vague casus foederis could allow 
signatories to apply a wide range of interpretation on whether or not 
the "catalyst" was actually taking place. It is for this reason that a 
precisely worded casus foederis, where there is little room for 
interpretation, is characteristic of a more viable treaty. An example 
of a treaty with a precisely worded casus foederis is the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) treaty which states: 
14Holsti, International Politics, A Framework for Analysis, p. 104. 
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... an armed attack on one or more of the parties is deemed to 
include an attack on the territory of any of the Parties.1 5 
2. Commitment of Signatories 
Similar to the casus foederis, the commitment required of 
signatories can either be written in vague or precise language. A 
precisely defined commitment may, for example, call for "immediate 
military counterattack" in the event of attack. This type of response 
is also referred to as a "hair trigger" clause. With a hair trigger 
clause, there is no room and no time for policy makers to discuss 
possible alternative courses of action once the casus foederis occurs. 
An example of a vaguely written commitment clause would call an 
ally to "act against the danger" in the event of the casus foederis. 
This wording is so vague that there are a myriad of options and 
interpretations with no precise time element in which to implement 
them. The more precisely worded commitment is characteristic of a 
more viable treaty. 
3. Integration of Forces 
Integration of forces is rare m most alliances. It entails one 
or more of the following actions: 
" 
eestablishing a supreme commander over all allied forces; 
estandardizing weapons systems; 
eintegrating personnel of different countries into one command 
structure; and 
epermitting one of the partners to draft and direct war plans for 
the alliance. 16 
15HoIsti, International Politics, A Framework for Analysis, p. 106. 
16HoIsti, International Politics, A Framework for Analysis, p. 105. 
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Alliances that have planned force integration are more 
flexible and better trained (out of necessity) than those that do not. 
4. Geographical Scope 
Geographical scope is usually precisely defined III alliances. 
The most common consideration is whether or not to include 
overseas colonies or territorial possessions of the signatories. 
5. Diverging Objectives 
The development of diverging objectives with regard to 
political, social, economic or military issues between signatories of an 
alliance can cause strains. For example, Pakistan joined the SEATO 
(Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty) alliance not primarily to 
oppose China or Russia as Washington had hoped, but instead to get 
access to sophisticated weaponry with which to counter India. 
Those alliances III which the signatories either have no diverging 
objectives, or can down play the importance of their diverging 
objectives by concentrating on objectives of higher importance are 
the most viable alliances. 
6. Similar Threat Perception 
The most critical characteristic of a viable alliance is 
common threat perception. It can "paper over" alliance strains in 
other areas or lead to a total breakdown in an alliance if not present. 
Post 1990 NATO is undergoing a transitional period where an ill-
defined threat IS currently calling the utility of the alliance into 
question. 
9 
7. Compatibility of Major Social and Political Values 
Examples of major social and political values contrasted 
include: 
-Capitalism vs. Communism 
-Sunni vs. Shiite 
-Democracy vs. Dictatorship 
As long as nation states face a common enemy, ideological 
incompatibilities seldom prevent the formation of alliances. Nation 
states of homogeneous ideologies however are more likely to be 
more committed to the alliance. 
8. Development of Nuclear weapons 
This variable may cause either a strain III an alliance or 
strengthen it depending on the relationship between the United 
States and the nuclear capable country. In the case of NATO, 
Britain's possession of nuclear weapons causes no problem, but 
France's nuclear capability does. Nuclear capability of a third world 
alliance partner would most likely cause a strain in the alliance given 
the U.S. stance on non-proliferation. 
The major United States treaties in place at present include 
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), ANZUS (Australia, New 
Zealand, United States), SEATO (Southeast Asia Collective Defense 
Treaty), and the IATRA (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance or Rio Treaty). Before we discuss the viability of a 
- bilateral U.S ./Brazilian alliance, we will analyze the viability of' the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Then, we will examine the 
10 
Organization of American States, and the Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance, (the IATRA or Rio Treaty), two institutions 
currently in place which were constructed for the purpose of 
hemispheric defense. 
As the first effective North American military alliance since the 
early 1800's, and the United States' most important and elaborate 
defense commitment,17 the pre-1990 NATO alliance provides a 
useful standard by which the viability of all alliances can be 
measured. Not surprisingly, the pre-1990 NATO alliance positively 
correlates to all of Holsti's comparative categories. 
There have been rifts in the treaty such as France's secession 
from military involvement, the unequal burdensharing debate, and 
the problems with internal rivalry such as that experienced by 
Greece and Turkey. Notwithstanding, the alliance has held together 
and remained viable for over forty years. Its expressed purpose was 
to prevent the spread of communism past the Eastern Bloc into 
Western Europe, and it achieved this. The Treaty actually did more 
than achieve this as demonstrated by the crumbling of the 
Communist Bloc and the now dubious utility of the Warsaw Pact to 
the Soviet Union. Moscow's initial concern with the balance of power 
shift following the reunification of Germany' gives further proof that 
the Soviets perceived NATO as a threat. By anyone's standard, the 
NATO alliance would have to be considered a successful strategy for 
17Terry L. Deibel, Changing Patterns of Collective Defense: U.S. Security 
Commitments in the Third World, in Alan Ned Sabrosky, ed. Alliances in U.S. 
Foreign Policy, (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1988), p. 107. 
1 1 
its time. The current viability of the NATO alliance has recently been 
called into question following events in the' Soviet Union and Eastern 
Bloc, so we will only be concerned with the pre-1990 portion of the 
NATO alliance~ 
The NATO alliance can be analyzed using Holsti's eight criteria as 
follows: 
-Is the Casus Foederis (Catalyst for Action) specified? 
Yes. Military measures can only be taken in responses to armed 
attack on one of the signatories. 
-Is the type of action to be taken by signatories 
specified? 
Yes. Every signatory is required to come to the aid of the attacked 
state. 
-Are plans in place to use integrated forces? 
Yes, with a Supreme Commander over all forces provided by the 
United States. 
-Is there a specific geographical Scope? 
Yes. Article five of the treaty states " ... an armed attack on one or 
more of the Parties is deemed to include an attack on the territory 
of any of the Parties . . ." 
-Are alliance members free of diverging objectives? 
Yes. All signatories recognize the need for a common defense 
against Soviet encroachment. There are minor divergences, but 
recognition of this main purpose overshadows them. 
12 
-Is there a clear perception of threat with no collateral 
threat to one or a few allies? 
Yes. Turkey and Greece created strains between themselves and 
other NATO members with the Cyprus conflict, but the clear 
perception of Soviet threat by all signatories has overshadowed 
incidents such as these. 
-Is there compatibility of social and political values 
between the allies? 
Generally yes. Turkey is the only non-Christian country in NATO. 
-Do members other than the United States have nuclear 
weapons? 
Yes, France and the United Kingdom do. U.S has expressed 
concern that French could use nuclear weapons in a manner 
contrary to U.S. interests. Washington assumes that France would 
automatically drag the United States into a war in which French 
nuclear weapons were used. France on the other hand has argued 
that Washington would be unwilling to use its nuclear weapons to 
support an ally because this could mean destruction of the United 
States by Soviet nuclear retaliation. 
Holsti's eight criteria can be viewed as independent variables in 
a hypothesis testing matrix. The stated hypothesis in this model is: 
"The degree of alliance viability is directly proportional to the 
number of independent variables that positively correlate." 
In other words, those alliances to which a "yes" answer occurs in 
every block of the hypothesis testing matrix are more viable than 
those alliances for which less than every block of the matrix contains 
a "yes" answer. The hypothesis testing matrix is provided in Figure 
1, on the following page. 
1 3 
{> INDEPENDENT VARIABLES {> 
A B C D E F G H 
Casus ~ommit- Force Geo- Free of Clear Compat- Members 
Foederis ~ent ntegra- graphical Diverg- hreat bility of have Nuc 
precise? precise ion? ~cope ng percep- social and Weaps? 
~nd precise? Objec- ion. No political 




YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
.. 
Figure 1: 









The independent variables in this model do not possess the same 
degree of importance. Clear perception of threat (variable "F") 
possesses the most weight, and can influence the applicability of the 
other categories. For example, one could argue that the ANZUS 
Treaty (Australia, New Zealand, U.S.) was weakened by New Zealand's 
refusal to allow nuclear ships into its ports. This would seem to 
suggest that category "G", (compatibility of social and political values) 
was the "alliance buster". In a broader context, this argument could 
be repudiated by arguing that the United States and New Zealand do 
not share a· similar perception of threat (Category "F"). If they did, 
U.S. nuclear powered ships would be welcomed in New Zealand. 
Having established NATO as the standard by which to measure 
alliances using the criteria as set forth by Holsti, we are now in a 
position to evaluate the viability of other alliances or potential 
alliances. 
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I I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The United States has harbored the idea of Pan American 
defense since World War I. This idea has survived (at least on 
paper) to the present day as demonstrated by the maritime strategy 
of the United States Navy which suggests a cooperative maritime 
defense of southern oceans with Latin American navies. IS 
A. THE PAN AMERICAN MOVEMENT 
The Pan American movement went through several phases of 
relationships throughout its history (see Figure 2 below). 
18Chief of Naval Operations, The Maritime Strategy,OPNAV 60 P-1-89, 
Department of the Navy, Revision 4, 23 February 1989, p. 7. 
16 
~P~H~A~S~E~ ____________________ ~CHARACTERIZED BY 
1. U.S. adopts pro economics stance. Bitter Latin American hostility 
Latins adopt pro security stance toward the United States. U. S. 
(1889-1928) primarily interested in expanding 
trade, and not interested in mutual 
security arrangement. Extensive U.S. 
intervention in the Caribbean fueled 
Latin American desire to develop Pan 
Americanism--primarily to achieve 
security against Europe, then the 
United States ~----------------------------~ 2. General Harmony 






This was most 
I------------------f harmonious period 
3. U.S. adopts Pro Security stance 
Latins adopt Pro economics stance 
(End WWII--Late 1950's) 
4. U.S. adopts anti Communism stance 
Latins maintain economic stance 
(Mid 1960's--present) 
Diverging goals and conflicting 
relations. U.S. pursuing cold war 
goals. Latin America promoting 
economic interest. Brief period of 
converging interest during Alliance 
for Progress (1959-1965) when U.S. 
broadened its notion of security to 
include economic and social concerns 
U.S interest in Latin American 
economic development declined. 
Latin America perceived their 
economic problems were a result of 
U.S. trade and aid restrictions. 
Nicaraguan revolution in 1979 gave 
renewed U.S. perception of threat to 
Caribbean Basin. Importance of 
Inter-American System declined for 
most parties. U.S. pursued regional 
security concerns without the Inter-
American System and became 
unwilling to commit significant 
resources to system's developmental 
~ ______ ~~ ____ ~~ __ ~~ __ ~ __ ~~~_r_o~~~r_a~m~s ____________ ~ __________ ~ 
Source: G. Pope Atkms, LatEn America En the International Political System, 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 214, 215. 
Figure 2: Phases of the Pan American Movement 
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The concept of Pan Americanism came into use in the 1880's and 
provided a point of departure from the unilateral Monroe Doctrine to 
the idea of a multilateral Inter-American concept. Institutionally, 
the Inter-American system began with the International Conference 
of American States which took place in Washington in 1889. The 
system developed in an ad-hoc manner over the next thirty five 
years. Several specialized agencies were created between 1902 and 
1945 such as the Pan American Health Organization, the Inter-
American Institute of Agricultural Sciences, and the Inter-American 
Defense Board.1 9 
From 1945 to 1948 these institutions became more formalized 
and expanded. Both the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance (lATRA or Rio Treaty)' and the Organization of American 
States (OAS) were established. Latin Americans wert? fully 
supportive of these developments, particularly after becoming 
fearful of waning United States interest .in Inter-American Affairs 
due to Washington's enthusiasm for the newly organized United 
Nations. The Chapultapec Conference of 1945 was an effort to 
establish a formal juridical basis for the Inter-American System and 
paved the way for the Special Rio de Janeiro conference in 1947 
which produced the Rio Treaty.20 
19G. Pope Atkins, Latin America in the International Political System, 
(Boulder; Westview Press, 1989), p. 207. 
20 Atkins, Latin America in the International Political System, p. 207. 
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B. THE MUTUAL SECURITY IDEA 
The mutual security idea developed into one of the main 
purposes of the Inter-American System. This required the 
development of mutual security arrangements which were first 
incorporated in 1938. They were redefined during World War II and 
then stated in the OAS charter and Rio Treaty. Some Inter-American 
security concepts dealt with outside threats, but most dealt with 
conflicts among the American States themselves.21 
Prior to 1930, the United States considered the unilateral 
Monroe Doctrine the quintessential security concept for the 
hemisphere. In a departure from this position the United States 
attempted to mount a unified Pan American front against the Central 
powers during World War I, but Latin America failed to comply. 
Brazil was the only South American State to declare war. 
Figure 3 describes the evolution of Pan American Security 
doctrine from a policy making viewpoint: 
21 Atkins, Latin America in the International Political System, p. 218. 
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EVENT DESCRIPTION 
Monroe Doctrine 1823-1930 United States unilaterally in charge of 
hemi~here security 
Various proposals by Latin Americans that Rejected for various reasons 
Monroe doctrine be made multilateral 
Multilateralization of Monroe doctrine Roosevelt Corollary dropped. Multilateral 
1930 defense concept accepted 
Buenos Aires Conference 1936 Adopted following statement: "in the event 
that the peace of the American republics is 
menaced, [the members of the Inter-
American System should] consult together 
for the purpose of finding and adopting 
methods of peaceful coo~eration" 
Lima Conference 1938 Stated in part that all American states 
"affirmed the intention of the American 
Republics to help one another in case of a 
foreign attack, either direct or indirect, on 
anyone of them" 
First Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Established neutrality zone around 
Affairs 11939) Americas 
Second Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Declaration of Reciprocal Assistance and 
Affairs(1940) cooperation for defense of Americas. 
Clearly Stated that an attack on one 
American state would be considered an 
attack on all and cooperative defensive 
measures would be taken after consultation 
Third Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) 
Affairs (1942) created. Charged with studying 
hemispheric defense and recommending 
solutions 
Mexico City Conference 1945 Act of Chapultapec. Broadened scope of 
aggression to include other American 
States 
... ",-
Rio de Janeiro Conference 1947 Inter-American 1 reaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance. Now the primary source of 
mutual security principles and procedures. 
Area of interest is from pole to pole. 
Canada and Greenland are included even 
though they are not signatories 
Source: G. Pope Atkins, Latin America in the International Political System, (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1989), pp. 218-220. 
Figure 3: Political Evolution of Pan American Security 
Doctrine 
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Jack Child has argued that the United States and Latin America 
have been in an unequal military alliance since 1930 which has had 
two periods of growth and decline since its creation: 
-creation and growth in World War II; 
-divergence and decline in the early Cold War years (1945-1961); 
-expansion and rebirth during the guerilla warfare period of the 
1960's; and 
-fragmentation and dysfunction in the contemporary years.22 
Figure 4 (below) describes the evolution of Pan American 
Security doctrine from a strategic viewpoint: 
22John Child, Unequal Alliance; The Inter American Military System, 1938-
1978, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), p. 1. 
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STRATEGIC CONCEPT CONCEPT DESCRIPTION 
American Lake (mid 19th century to 1933) Inspired by the Monroe Doctrine. 
Unilaterally saw U.S. strategic concerns 
almost exclusively related to Caribbean 
Benign Neglect (1933-1939) Inspired by the Good Neighbor Policy. 
Region became a strategic vacuum (no U.S. 
Strategy) 
Quarter--Sphere Defense (1932-1942) Establishment of a defendable perimeter 
around the northern half of the Western 
Hemisphere 
Hemisphere Defense (1939 to the present) A collective responsibility shared by all 
members of the Inter-American System 
Special Bilateral Relationships (1942- Nations selected by virtue of location, 
Present) historical association or vital assets. 
Traditionally these have been Brazil, 
Mexico, the larger Caribbean island nations 
and countries involved in Isthmian canal 
considerations 
Secondary Space (the Cold War Years) World was divided into Primary Space 
(Power Belt or first World) and Secondary 
Space. Latin America (in the secondary 
space) had the peripheral responsi bili ties 
of supplying strategic raw materials to the 
Western Countries of the Primary S~ace 
The Foco Theory (1959 to the Present) The export of revolution and guerilla 
warfare provoking massive United States 
intervention in the hemisphere. The 
Military system grew to its apogee during 
this period 
Anti-Foco (1961-present) The application of counter-insurgency and 
civil action principles to prevent or 
contain the focos (The Alliance for 
Progress was instituted in part as an anti-
foco measure) 
Intervention by consent (1976--present Foreign military involvement is requested 
in an existing hemispheric conflict 
Source: John Child, Unequal Alliance; The Inter American Military System. 1938-1978, 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 5-8. 
Figure 4: Strategic Evolution of Pan American Security 
Doctrine 
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There has been a wealth of planning and policy guidance 
concermng hemispheric defense. The culmination of this planning 
was the O.A.S (Organization of American States), and the Rio Treaty. 
The Organization of American States was formed in 1948, and 
was concerned with formalizing rules and procedures within the 
western hemisphere such as: 
-Settling regional disputes by peaceful means; 
-Rendering mutual assistance in the event of external 
aggression; 
-Stressing "representative democracy" to maintain the 
solidarity between States; 
-The need for economic cooperation between states and 
upholding human rights.23 
The OAS has been utilized several times In concert with the Rio 
Treaty but also by itself, most notably during the 1954 U.S. 
intervention into Guatemala, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, and the 
1981 armed conflict between Ecuador and Peru.24 In more recent 
years however, the Organization of American States (OAS) has been 
used more as a political instrument to oppose the United States than 
as a basis for coalition defense. Members use it to suit their 
particular needs. It has been used to unify Latin American opinion 
against the United States (as was done during the Grenada and 
Panamanian invasions), and to gain support for a national cause (as 
Argentina attempted to do during its invasion of the Falklands). 
23Harold Molineu, U.S. Policy Toward Latin America, (Westview Press: Boulder) 
1986, pp. 27. 
24 Atkins Latin America in the International Political System, pp. 222, 223. 
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The OAS has not lived up to the expectations of its founders. 
From the Latin American perspective, the OAS has failed because the 
United States disregarded it on several occasions with regards to 
non-intervention. From the U.S. perspective, the OAS has 
demonstrated increasing impotence. The Latin American countries 
rejected the U.S. call for collective action by the OAS regarding 
intervention during the Nicaraguan revolution. In El Salvador, the 
OAS gave public support for democratic principles and elections, but 
declined to take an active role in seeing that they were 
implemented. 25 The OAS called for a diplomatic solution to the 
mounting friction between the United States and Panama between 
1987 and 1989. The failure of these efforts led to U.S. military 
intervention in 1989. 
Further evidence of the organization's declining importance is 
" the Latin American formulation of the Contadora Group,26 the Latin 
American Economic System (SELA), and the Esquipulus II accords,27 
all initiatives that would have been performed by the OAS had it 
been more viable. 
The viability of the Rio Treaty for hemispheric defense will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
25Margaret Daly Hayes, Latin America and the U.S. National Interest, (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1984), p. 250. 
26Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela formed the Contadora group in 
1983. The group proposed to serve as a mediator in seeking peaceful 
negotiation in Central America. 
27President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica proposed a peace plan for Central 
America following the failure of the Contadora initiatives. Arias' plan became 
known as the Esquipulus II accords. 
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III. THE RIO TREATY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
The previous chapter provided a summary of the extensive 
administrative and strategic thought that has been devoted to the 
idea of hemispheric defense. The culmination of this activity has 
been the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (IA TRA) or 
Rio Treaty. The Rio Treaty was the first joint security pact entered 
into by the United States after world War II. Invoked in 1947, it 
preceded the North Atlantic Treaty by two years. The Rio Treaty 
currently has twenty two signatories from both the Caribbean Region 
and Latin America. 
This chapter will provide an analysis of the independent 
variables associated with the Rio Treaty using Holsti's eight criteria 
as set forth in Chapter 1. 
A. THE CASUS FOEDERIS 
The IA TRA declares that an armed attack against any American 
country would be considered an attack against all. 28 This catalyst for 
action has occurred on numerous occasions resulting from inter-
hemispheric conflicts, but has never occurred as a result of intra-
hemispheric conflict. Instances of the casus foederis coming into 
play are listed in Figure 5 below: 
28Harold Molineu, u.s. Policy Toward Latin America, (Westview Press: Boulder) 


























Cuban Missile Crisis 
United States/Panama 
Cuba (4 applications of anti-
Communist measures) 
1963-1965 Dominican Republic/HaitL 
1965 Dominican Republic (Civil War) 
1969 EI Salvador/Honduras 
1979 Nicaragua (Anti-Communism) 
1981 Ecuador/Peru 
1982 Argentina/Great Britain 
~------------------------~ 
Source: G. Pope Atkins, Latin America in the Interti:rional Political System, 
(Boulder; Westview Press, 1989), p. 222. 
Figure 5: Applications of the Rio Treaty 
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B. THE COMMITMENT OF SIGNATORIES 
The nature of assistance which is to be rendered by the 
signatories in the event of armed attack is neither stated, nor 
automatic. Instead, the treaty calls for a meeting of national foreign 
ministers to determine the appropriate response which must be 
agreed upon by two-thirds vote. 29 A military response is left to the 
discretion of each signatory. 
C. FORCE INTEGRATION 
There have been some efforts made at force integration between 
United States and Latin American militaries. The primary military 
training in support of the Rio Treaty consists of "UNITAS",30 an 
annual joint naval exercise which covers the area of the South 
Atlantic and South Pacific adjacent to Latin America. Several Latin 
American navies join the United States Navy in the yearly exercise 
which is a simulated South Atlantic and South Pacific war focusing on 
antisubmarine warfare. Much attention has been lavished on the 
social and political aspects of UNITAS, however its tactical and 
strategic significance has been the subject of debate.31 In addition to 
UNIT AS, the joint amphibious exercises VERITAS and CARBEX are 
29 Atkins, Latin America in the International Political System, p. 26. 
30The origin of the term UNITAS is shrouded in controversy. Some say it is a 
Latin word meaning unity. Others say it is an acronym for "United 
Interamerican Antisumarine Warfare [Excercise]." 
31Robert L. Schein a, Latin America, a Naval History 1810-1987, (Annapolis: 
Naval Institute Press, 1987) p. 175. 
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held at regular intervals by U.S., Argentine and Brazilian marines in 
the Caribbean.32 
In addition to these training exercises, the United States 
government has made older U.S. Naval ships available to several 
Latin American countries by way of "no cost leasing". This is an 
arrangement whereby the receiving country finances costs for 
restoration of the ship to U.S. Navy standards, crew training, and 
obtaining spare parts. At the end of its useable life, the ship is either 
sold outright to the country for an extremely discounted price, or the 
country may sell the ship for scrap and give the proceeds to the U.S. 
government. U sed aircraft have also been sold to several Latin 
American countries under the U.S. government's Foreign Military 
Sales program. 
The United States has an intelligence exchange arrangement in 
place with selected Latin American countries, as well as a program 
enabling maritime operations independent of government 
involvement between U.S. and Latin American navies under the aegis 
of the "Common Strategic Consideration Papers". There are also 
navy-to-navy operations between Latin American countries 
independent of the United States navy. One example of this is 
"Fraterno," a yearly Argentine/Brazilian exercise33 (See Appendix C 
for a list of joint U.S./Brazilian naval initiatives). 
32Rene Luria, "The Brazilian Armed Forces, Budgets and Ambition Diverge," 
International Defense Review, July 1989, p. 933. 
33Briefing by Captain Patrick Roth and CDR John G. Karas USN, Western 
Hemisphere Branch, Politico-Military Policy and Current Plans Division of op-
06, at U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca., 9 September 1990. 
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D. GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE 
The Northern and Southern boundaries of the Rio Treaty as 
spelled out at the Rio de Janeiro Conference in 1947 are from pole to 
pole. Canada and Greenland are included even though they are not 
signatories. The oceanic area included under the Rio Treaty is 
limited to the western portion of the South Atlantic. Any hostile 
action occurring in the eastern South Atlantic (which is the area that 
contains most of the trade routes to the United States) would not be 
covered under this treaty.3 4 
E. DIVERGING OBJECTIVES 
From its outset, the IATRA experienced multiple cases of 
diverging objectives. The treaty was essentially designed as a 
collective security agreement against Soviet threats to United States 
national security interests which was drafted with little regard to the 
Latin American interests or point of view.35 The Latin American 
point of view was that no significant Soviet threat to the Western 
hemisphere existed, but if one materialized, the United States would 
counter it. Latin planners treated the agreement as a means of 
utilizing the United States to quell regional rivalries which were seen 
as a more imminent threat. 36 This factor spells a fundamental 
difference between the IA TRA and the North Atlantic Treaty 
34Kelly and Child, eds. Geopolitics of the Southern Cone and Antarctica, p. 218. 
35Viron P. Vaky, et at, Governance in the Western Hemisphere (New York: 
Praeger, 1983), p. 165. 
36 James D. Barton, "The Viability of the Rio Treaty as a Basis for Coalition 
Defense", paper presented to the National War College, February, 1986, p. 6. 
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Organization (NATO) alliance. The Soviet threat has always been 
clearly perceived by all signatories of NATO, but has been remote to 
most Latin planners. Marxist-inspired revolution in Nicaragua, El 
Salvador and Grenada prompted only a lukewarm response from 
countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Mexico. These 
incidents, which were viewed by the United States as vital to 
security interests, were overshadowed in other Latin American 
countries by their own problems as well as reluctance by Latin 
American countries to side with the United States whose policy 
action is often characterized by vacillation and lack of positive action. 
As columnist Stephen Rosenfeld noted: 
While not wanting the hemisphere opened wider either to 
communist penetration or American intervention, the Latin fear IS 
that their own fragile societies will be infected by the disease of 
violence and polarization which will distract from coping with 
need for modernization, an inherently destabilizing influence)7 
This problem will be discussed further under "Threat Perception." 
The United States has defined its interests in Latin America as 
being centered around debt reduction, anti-narcotics measures, 
support for democracy and environmental concerns.38 These issues 
relate to domestic issues in the United States, and have a bearing on 
what the United States public will tolerate concerning alliances, 
37Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "By Latins for Latins", The Washington Post, 17 
January 86, p. A13. 
38Secretary of State James A. Baker, Latin America and the U.S.: A New 
Partnership, Current Policy Bulletin No. 1160, United States Department of 
State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington D.C., 30 March 1989, p. 1. 
30 
military, and humanitarian aid. The Reagan administration's lack of 
support for Argentina during the Falklands conflict was seen by 
many Latin Americans as confirmation that the U.S. commitment to 
NATO was of higher interest than its commitment to the IATRA.3 9 
By the beginning of 1988, the following sixteen Latin American 
countries had become full members of the Nonaligned Movement: 
Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Grenada, 
Guyana, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, St. Lucia, Suriname, and 
Trinidad-Tobago. The following eight countries attended as 
observers: Barbados, Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominica, El Salvador, Mexico, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela.40 It should be noted that these countries 
support the Nonaligned Movement to varying degrees. For example, 
Cuba has been a leader in the Nonaligned Movement, whereas 
Argentina and Chile give the Movement less support. 
F. THREAT PERCEPTION AND COLLATERAL THREATS 
As mentioned earlier, the countries of Latin America have not 
shared the United States' concern over Soviet expansionism. The 
concept of security for many Latin American countries centers 
around domestic political unity, social progress and economic 
development. This feeling was demonstrated in the 1983 report of 
the Inter-American Dialogue: 
39 James D. Barton, "The Viability of the Rio Treaty as a Basis for Coalition 
Defense", paper presented to the National War College, February,- 1986, p. 13. 
40 Atkins, Latin America in the International Political System, p. 81. 
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When Latin Americans think of security, most of them think of 
the internal challenges of national unity and development of 
border issues with neighboring states, and, in some cases, of the 
possibility of intervention by the United States. In the United 
States, the focus on security is external, global, and strategic. The 
United States generally seeks to assure political stability abroad, 
sometimes by supporting the status quo under sharp internal or 
regional challenge. Many Latin Americans feel that profound 
change is inevitable in their region, and that an emphasis on 
immediate stability is therefore misguided.41 
Even in the United States, there is now a debate going on about 
the nature of the current threat. Both the "low threat view" and the 
"high threat/future threat" view will be presented below. 
The most significant changes to United States national security 
from 1945 to 1980 occurred almost exclusively as a series of 
reactions to perceived Soviet threat. Perception of threat is a far 
more effective rallying cry to national security policy than support 
for democracy, human rights, or other such causes. Historically, 
when the United States has not perceived a threat, it has not taken 
security measures. 
1. The Low Threat Argument 
r 
The United States Navy has, since World War II, been 
dedicated to countering the "Soviet Threat". If the "Declaration of 
Peace" made by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in 1988 is genuine, 
the national needs for naval preparedness are much different now 
than they have been in the past. By getting out of the cold war, the 
41llThe Americas at a Crossroads. II report of the Inter-American Dialogue. 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. April, 1983, pp. 40-41. 
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Soviets have admitted to the United States, the world, and 
themselves that they are a second-place superpower. Resources once 
dedicated to the "communist crusade" should now be dedicated 
inward. Even if Gorbachev fails, the majority of the Soviet Union's 
governmental attention must be focused inward m order to recover. 
As observed by Captain Gerald G. O'Rourke, U.S. Navy 
(Retired): 
For the developing world, Soviet communism is hardly the 
political system to emulate ... Lenin's doctrine is teetering on the 
edge of ideological and economic bankruptcy, most notably in 
Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union is now just another of the 
world's struggling nations, troubled by internal unrest, burdened 
by a massive military infrastructure, and bedeviled by the legacy 
of grandiose expansionist tendencies of the past. The Soviets have 
more than enough to keep them busy at home, not abroad, for a 
long time to come.42 
The primary threat is no longer the Soviet Union, but third 
world countries practicing local adventurism, and inspired not by 
East-West ideological differences, but by religion or ethnicity. This 
being the case, there IS no reason to maintain many of the current 
long-standing treaties and less reason to create any new ones. 
Unsophisticated third world militaries can be effectively countered 
by the less sophisticated forces of our military allies (and economic 
competitors) instead of involving the high-tech U.S. Navy.43 
42Gerald G. O'Rourke, U.S. Navy (Retired), "Our Peaceful Navy", U.S. Naval 
Institute Proceedings, April 1989, p. 80. 
430'Rourke, "Our Peaceful Navy", p. 81. 
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The Defense Department has recently . developed a new 
strategy that shifts security' interests away from a major conflict 
with the Soviet Union in Europe, and toward potential regional 
conflicts such as the Iraqi conflict of August 1990. The blueprint was 
developed by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin 
Powell and has been approved by Secretary of defense Richard 
Cheney and President George Bush. The new strategic thinking is 
that the Soviets will not be able to launch a major offensive in 
Western Europe for as long as two years once they withdraw from 
Eastern Europe. The new plan is consistent with the Bush 
administration's plan to reduce the military personnel strength by 
25% and reduce spending by 10% over the next five years.44 
The new strategy (which is currently being referred to as 
the "Reconstitution Strategy") is based on removing the bulk of U.S. 
forces from Europe and instead relying on forces based in the United 
States (both active and reserve) to deploy on short notice in case of 
major war with the Soviet Union.45 
a. Implications of a Low Threat Environment on 
the Strategic Value of the South Atlantic 
The importance of the South Atlantic to United States 
interests is a subject of controversy. The historic lack of any clear-
cut defense planning or military alliances with countries sharing 
44John D. Morrocco, "New Pentagon Strategy Shifts Focus From Europe to 
Regional Conflicts", Aviation Week and Space Technology, 13 August 90, p. 25. 
45 James J. Tritten, "America Promises to Come Back: . A New National Strategy", 
NPS-NS-91-003, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca., 26 December 1990, 
pp. 1-13. 
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interest in the freedom of the South Atlantic would seem to bear out 
the theory that the United States considers the area of secondary 
interest and does not perceive a threat to this region. 
Much has been written regarding the strategic 
importance of the South Atlantic. Most Latin American writers place 
a far higher strategic value on the area than do writers of the United 
States. Indeed, a portion of the rationale given for Argentina taking 
back the Falklands rested on the belief that the South Atlantic held 
great strategic importance. 
From a historical perspective, the South Atlantic was the 
scene of German U-boat activity in both World Wars. During the 
second World War, the northeast bulge of Brazil was referred to by 
the Brazilian military as "Brazil's stationary aircraft carrier", and was 
viewed as a "springboard to victory" with respect to controlling the 
area. Interest in the South Atlantic was rekindled with events of the 
mid 1970's which included the ·oil crisis of 1973, the increasing 
importance of Southeastern Atlantic oil sea lanes, the Cuban role in 
Angola, and the availability of west African ports to the Soviets.46 
The following argument summarizes the thoughts of 
most writers who placed a high strategic value on control of the 
South Atlantic in the 1970's: 
The rise of the supertanker, too large for the Suez Canal (and 
the closure of the canal after the 1967 Israel-Egypt war), had 
46Jack Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in South America, (New York: Praeger, 
1985), p. 125. 
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made the Cape of Good Hope route, and hence the South Atlantic, a 
key economic lifeline for Western Europe and the United States, 
which the expansion of the Soviet blue-water fleet put under 
constant threat. Adding to this the coming of the Alaskan 
supertankers, too large for the Panama Canal, and the possible 
threat to the Canal from left-wing control with the Panama Canal 
Treaty in 1977, Argentine writers saw the Southern Atlantic as a 
key global strategic zone, and were constantly puzzled by the low 
priority given the the region by the United States and western 
powers.47 
Despite these events, the actual Soviet presence and 
interest in the South Atlantic remained low. Many analysts 
concluded that if the Soviets wanted to cut off South Atlantic oil 
supply lines to the west, they could more easily do so at the Persian 
Gulf or Strait of Hormuz. Nevertheless, the idea of a South Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (SATO) was postulated in 1976 shortly after the 
Cuban intervention of Angola. The concept of SA TO stemmed from 
the fact that the NATO southern boundary stopped at the Tropic of 
Cancer and that the South Atlantic area was not covered by any 
other western treaty.4 8 
SA TO was originally envisioned to be a defense coalition 
between Argentina, Uruguay Brazil, and South Africa. Brazil rejected 
the idea primarily for two reasons: an inability to maintain a 
sizeable battle fleet in the South Atlantic, and a refusal to recognize 
47Kelly and Child, eds. Geopolitics of the Southern Cone and Antarctica , pp. 
227, 228. 
48Child, Geopolitics and Conflict , p. 125. 
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Pretoria's apartheid government. To do otherwise would have 
threatened Brazil's economic ties with black Africa.49 
The strategic and economic importance of the South 
Atlantic has varied with historical events such as the closing of the 
Suez Canal and development of the super tanker as demonstrated by 
Figure 6 below: 
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A. Pre 1869--Neither Suez or Panama Canals built yet. South Atlantic only 
routes available. 
B. 1869--Suez Canal opens. 
Cape of Good Hope. 
Provides alternate trade route to going around 
C. 1910--Panama Canal Opens--Provides alternate route to Strait of Magellan, 
Beagle Channel, Drake Straits. 
D. 1941--World War H--Suez Canal closed for 76 days. Navigation hazardous 
through Suez while it was open. Allied shipping attacked in South Atlantic and 
Caribbean. 
E. 1945--World War II over. 
F. 19S6--Suez War (Arab/Israeli). Suez Canal closed for five months. 
G. 19S7--Suez War over. Canal opened. 
H. 1967--ArablIsraeli War. Suez Canal closed eight years due to mining. Also 
clogged with sunken ships, and remnants of tanks, airplanes and other 
equipment. 
" I. 1975--Suez Canal opens. 
J. 1976--Dredging allows Supertankers one way use of Suez Canal (unloaded 
[shallower draft]). 
K. 1980's--Soviet and Cuban interest in Africa followed by decline of interest 
in late 1980s. 
L. 1990--Cold War over. 
Figure 6: 
Soviet and Cuban interest in Africa gone. 
The Changing Importance of the South 
Atlantic 
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For the last fifteen years, the South Atlantic has had a 
declining significance to the economic and strategic interests of the 
United States. Even at the height of Soviet expansionism in the 
1970's and 1980's, the threat to these interests was low. The South 
Atlantic has not been, nor is it now, a pnmary theater of super 
power rivalry.50 
2. The High Threat/Future Threat Argument 
To many, recent events in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe have seemingly ended the cold war. Others see the attitude 
that "the Soviet Union is gone as an adversary" as being extremely 
dangerous to United States national security posture. 
The international environment has been transformed, but in 
what ways and to what extent is still a matter of speculation at best. 
Much depends on the success or failure of Mikhail Gorbachev and the 
three possible outcomes of his perestroika; succeeding, failing (with 
neither of these options being necessarily favorable to the United 
States), or continuing to "muddle through." If successful, the Soviet 
Union could emerge with a stronger, more efficient economy and a 
military more threatening than it has ever been. Failure of 
perestroika could lead to the reinstallation of totalitarian controls 
necessary to combat the resulting anarchy. Muddling through for 
five or ten years will give the United States more time to assess the 
50Donald E. Nuechterlein, America Overcommitted (Lexington: The University 
Press of Kentucky, 1985), p. 159. 
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newly emerging world system and plan accordingly. The sincerity of 
Soviet "new thinking" can better be evaluated.51 
Sea power will always remain crucial to the national 
security of the United States whether for countering third-world 
aggression, or strategically deterring the Soviet Union. 
Scientist Colin Gray noted that: 
Political 
Without freedom to use sea lines of communication (SLOCs) 
more or less at will, the United States would find itself shorn of 
much ability to take the initiative beyond North America (since 
such initiatives would entail passage over uncontrolled seas) and, 
given the growing interdependencies of economies, would find 
defense mobilization all but impossible to effect.52 
Defense Secretary Dick Cheney said earlier this year: 
America's global military posture and leadership promotes an 
international environment in which free peoples and those 
seeking freedom can prosper . . . not only does our presence deter 
Soviet influence, it also can dampen regional arms competition 
and discourage local powers from seeking to dominate their 
neighbors. 53 
The fall of communism is not necessarily a cause for 
disarmament and demobilization. On the contrary, the fall of 
communism may be destabilizing. Peace in Europe will not be as 
secure as it was for the last forty years. A reunified Germany 
51John L. Daily, "If Mikhail Muddles Through", U.S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings, June 1990, pp. 73, 74. 
52Colin Gray, "Tomorrow's Forecast: Warmer/Still Cloudy", U.S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings, May 1990, pp. 40, 42. 
53Gray, "Tomorrow's Forecast: Warmer/Still Cloudy", p. 42. 
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interacting in the economics and politics of a weakened Eastern 
Europe could be the kind of environment that has in the past led to 
war. 54 
As former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger said, 
You will never know that you haven't got enough until it's too 
late to do anything about it. So yes, you err on the side of caution. 
You err on the side of having perhaps more than some people 
sitting down in some academic atmosphere will say you really 
require. I never felt sufficiently confident in my own ability, or 
anybody else's ability, to say what was precisely enough. So I 
always felt that we should have at least enough so that the 
Soviets, by any kind of calculation, would never feel that they 
could make a successful attack. 
Weinberger has also warned of the possible Soviet tactic of 
using rhetoric to disengage the United States from Europe, a goal 
they have been striving for since he end of World War II. Unable to 
do it by threats, they are achieving their objective by using the 
argument that there is no longer a threat. Substantial military 
disengagement has not yet occurred.55 Nothing has been done to 
change the nuclear equation. Soviet strategic forces, the only ones in 
the world that can destroy the United States, are being modernized 
and enhanced. Gorbachev has publicly stated that his aim is to make 
the Soviet military smaller, better, and more efficient.56 
540ray, "Tomorrow's Forecast: Warmer/Still Cloudy", p. 44. 
550ray , "Tomorrow's Forecast: Warmer/Still Cloudy", p. 51. 
560eneral Colin Powell, "Crystal Balls Don't Always Help", U.S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings, May 90, p. 63. 
41 
In summary, the threats to the United States are both 
numerous and diverse. The Soviet Union is still a military 
superpower with highly capable conventional and nuclear 
capabilities. The world has never been free of hostility. The ongoing 
war in El Salvador, the restoration of democracy in Panama, coup 
attempts in the Philippines and Liberia and the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait are recent examples of this fact. The United States has 
commitments to its allies in Southeast Asia, Japan and Europe which 
need a military dimension to remain credible. The added burden on 
the military of fighting in the drug war takes away even more 
resources from other national security threats, and finally the 
worldwide commercial and security interests of the United States 
require a strong capable navy. Any assistance the United States can 
get from capable allies would not only be appreciated, but also 
greatly needed. 
As Colin Powell said; 
... the true 'peace dividend' is peace itself--the very first 
requirement of a democratic government. Peace comes about 
through maintenance of strength. So when people ask me what 
my strategy is, I say it's very simple. Peace through strength is 
my strategy. Peace is the objective and strength is the means.57 
strong. 
For these reasons, the United States military must remain 
Coalition defense has always been the backbone of U.S. 
defense strategy. As President George Bush said, "we have never 
been able· to 'go it alone' even in the early days of the cold war when 
57Powell. "Crystal Balls Don't Always Help". p. 64. 
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our major allies were still suffering from the devastation and 
exhaustion of World War II." He went on to say, "we are prepared to 
share more fully with our allies and friends the responsibilities of 
global leadership".5 8 
a. Implications of a High Threat/Future Threat 
Environment on the Strategic Value of the South 
Atlantic 
There are five strategic "choke points" in the South 
Atlantic as indicated on Figure 7 below: 
58president George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States, The 




Key to Strategic Choke Points 




E--Cape of Good Hope 
F --Suez Canal 
Figure 7: Strategic Choke Points 
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Maintaining freedom of navigation through these 
chokepoints is of vital interest, not only to the countries of Latin 
America, but also to the United States and its allies. 
The most important maritime interest for the United 
States in the South Atlantic is the movement northward of Persian 
Gulf oi1.59 Approximately 66% of the oil shipped to Western Europe 
and about 26% of that shipped to the east coast of the United States 
goes through the South Atlantic.60 Bauxite, beryllium, chromite, 
vanadium, cobalt, columbium, manganese, platinum, and tantalum 
also travel through the South Atlantic enroute to the United States 
and Britain.61 
To further illustrate the area's importance to trade, 
27,000 ships steam around the Cape of Good Hope per year 
transporting 90 percent of the west's petroleum, 70 percent of its 
minerals and 25 percent of its food imports.62 
Figures 8 and 9 (below) show principal trade routes 
through the South Atlantic: 
590rlando Bonturi, Brazil and the Vital South Atlantic, (Washington D.C.: 
National Defense University Press, 1988), pp. 10, 11. 
60Captain Joaquin Stella, "Stabilizing the Uneasy Atlantic", U.S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings, March 89, p. 59. 
61 Bonturi, Brazil and the Vital South Atlantic, pp. 10, 11. 
62Bonturi, Brazil and the Vital South Atlantic, p. 18. 
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-Source: Robert J. Branco, The United States and Brazil, (Washington D.C.: 
National Defense University Press, 1984), p. 78. 




Source: Robert J. Branco, The United States and Brazil, (Washington D.C.: 
National Defense University Press, 1984), p. 78. 
Figure 9: South Atlantic Trade Routes of North 
American and European Interest 
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In terms of national security, the South Atlantic's 
strategic significance would increase with the closing of the Suez or 
Panama Canals, or in the event of military conflict in Europe or the 
Indian Ocean. 
From a naval strategy point of view, former U.S. Chief of 
Naval Operations, Admiral James D. Watkins has expressed concern 
that Soviet SSBNs, instead of staying in geographically confined 
"bastions" close to the Soviet Union, may instead be operating or be 
planning to operate in Southern waters. His views were seconded by 
former Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFL T) Admiral 
Harry D. Train II. Train has argued that the South Atlantic, being 
light on anti -submarine warfare patrols and capabilities would offer 
a relatively safe patrol area to which the Soviet Union could deploy 
its SSBNs. Train cites several years of Soviet hydrographical research 
and periodic deployment of Delta Class SSBNs as supporting evidence 
that the Soviets would station submarines in these waters.63 
In summary, threat to the area of the 'South Atlantic is not well 
defined at this point. Elements of both the low threat and the high 
threat/future threat arguments appear to be valid. The United 
States government seems to be leaning in favor of the low threat 
argument with respect to the Soviet Union by virtue of Washington's 
consideration of the new "Reconstitution Strategy." However, 
regional threats are very real as demonstrated by the Middle East 
63Jan S. Breemer. "The Soviet Navy's SSBN Bastions: New Questions Raised". 
RUSI Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies. June 
1987. pp. 39-43. 
48 
-----------------~- - ---- --
war of January and February, 1991. Internal regional threats such 
as narco-trafficking, narco-terrorism and insurgency directly affect 
most countries in the area of the South Atlantic. Extra hemispheric 
regional problems such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait also affect the 
economies of these countries. 
Whether or not a military partnership between the United States 
and Brazil should be based on some aspect of the "Reconstitution 
Strategy" or on aspects of regional threat, will be investigated in 
Chapter V. 
G. COMPATIBILITY OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL VALUES 
All Latin American members of the alliance are now generally 
capitalistic, democratic, Christian countries which in a broad sense 
make them socially and politically compatible with the United States. 
There have been numerous instances of military dictatorships 
coming to power in countries throughout Latin America, but as 
Robert Wesson has put it, the pendulum seems to be swinging more 
and more in favor of democratically elected governments.64 
H. NUCLEAR WEAPON CAPABILITIES OF SIGNATORIES 
No Latin American country currently has nuclear weapon 
capability. Some analysts believe Brazil and Argentina will have this 
capability by the year 2000, but both countries have denied the 
64Robert Wesson, ed., The Latin American Military Institution, (New York: 
Praeger, 1986), p. xiii. 
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desire to use nuclear technology for anything but peaceful purposes 
(See further discussion in Chapter V). 
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IV. THE RIO TREATY: AN EVALUATION OF THE DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
The following chapter summarizes the information presented in 
the previous chapter, and is arranged according to Holsti's eight 
criteria: 
A. IS THE CASUS FOEDERIS (CATALYST FOR ACTION) 
SPECIFIED? 
Yes. Military measures can only be taken in response to armed 
attack on one of the signatories. 
B. IS THE TYPE OF ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY SIGNATORIES 
SPECIFIED? 
No. It is neither stated nor automatic. Use of military force is 
optional to each signatory. 
C. ARE PLANS IN PLACE TO USE INTEGRATED FORCES? 
No. Some integration has taken place in the form of Foreign 
Military Sales to Latin American countries and occasional coordinated 
operations between signatories. However, the overall ability of these 
forces to integrate effectively is questionable due to sporadic 
participation in training operations, a small number of training 
operations, and a generally low military ~apabi1ity of most 
signatories. 
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D. IS THERE A SPECIFIC GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE? 
Yes. The geographical scope is from pole to pole, including all of 
the continental American states, Alaska, and adjacent islands with 
the exception of Hawaii. It covers Canada and Greenland even 
though they are not signatories. 
E. ARE ALLIANCE MEMBERS FREE OF DIVERGING 
OBJECTIVES? 
No. The cause of most divergences centers around the Latin 
quest for economIC security which has pre-empted an interest in 
military security. 
F. IS THERE A CLEAR PERCEPTION OF THREAT WITH NO 
COLLATERAL THREAT TO ONE OR A FEW ALLIES? 
No. At the treaty's formation, the United States was more 
interested in unified defense against Soviet threat. The United States 
is now unsure of the current threat status. The Latin Americans 
have been more interested in regional stability and economic 
progress. 
G. IS THERE COMPATIBILITY OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL 
VALVES BETWEEN THE ALLIES? 
Yes. All signatories generally are Christian, democratic, and 
capitalistic with few exceptions. 
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H. DO MEMBERS OTHER THAN THE UNITED STATES HAVE 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS? 
No. The United States, through non-proliferation measures has 
attempted to thwart Argentine and Brazilian development of nuclear 
weapons (See Chapter V). 
The preceding eight criteria are presented as independent 
variables in the hypothesis testing matrix for the case of the Rio 
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As demonstrated in the matrix, the Rio Treaty is not a viable 
alliance as explained by negative responses in categories B, C, E, and 
F. 
Categories B, C, and E are problems which have been in place 
since the Treaty's inception. Although Latin America's position with 
regard to category F (threat perception) has been debatable for some 
time, the events of 1989 in the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc have 
now made even the United States' position questionable. 
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V. EV ALUATING THE OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 
In its present condition, the IATRA is not a viable basis for 
coalition defense. Those adherents of the "low threat" argument 
would argue that this is not a problem since there is no need for the 
alliance anyway. On the other hand, proponents of the "high 
threat/future threat" argument would say that something should be 
done about the treaty, even if the present situation does not seem to 
support a change in the status quo. 
There are three options with regard to the Rio Treaty. One has 
already been mentioned; write the IATRA off as a worthless treaty 
for a nonexistent threat, and do nothing. The other two options are 
to revitalize the existing treaty, or to replace the treaty with 
carefully selected bilateral defense agreements. 
A. REVITALIZING THE EXISTING TREATY 
In order to revitalize the treaty, categories B, C, and E of the 
hypothesis testing matrix must be dealt with. 
correcting these categories are listed below: 
Four possible means of 
" 
-Redefine the casus foederis to include such Issues as 
insurgencies, drug trafficking, narco-terrorism, and defense of 
overseas interests, in addition to military attack. 
-Re-write the vaguely worded commitment to mandate specific 
military responses to specifically worded catalysts. 
-Increase the level of force integration by increasing the number 
of training exercises between signatories, increasing inter-
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operability of weapons systems, and installing a command 
structure patterned after NATO. 
The most important category is category F, "threat perception." 
By expanding the casus foederis to include counterinsurgency, narco-
terrorism, and defense of overseas interests, the threat perception 
may become broader to some of the countries. For other countries, it 
may not. Countries that show no interest in the new initiative to 
revitalize the treaty should be allowed to leave it. 
A possible danger to this approach is that no countries may show 
interest (or none of the countries with the most substantial 
militaries) in the new initiative, thus causing the treaty to collapse 
altogether. This would not be desirable. Although the treaty is non-
viable as a defense mechanism, it still provides a web of personal 
contacts which could be useful at a future date. 
Even if the smaller countries agreed to this proposal, their 
usefulness for a joint naval partnership is marginal. Argentina, 
Brazil and possibly Chile are the only Latin American navies that 
have the capability to project force outside of their territorial waters. 
Assigning the role of defending overseas interests to any Latin 
American navies other than these would require major augmentation 
of their capabilities, a measure unlikely to be undertaken either by 
the individual countries or the United States, glVen the magnitude of 
upgrade required. 
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A better course of action would be to keep the Rio Treaty in 
place, but add focused partnerships with the three most capable 
navies. 
B. KEEP THE TREATY, BUT ADD BILATERAL AGREEMENTS 
This option entails decreasing emphasis on the treaty and 
instead pursuing a program of bilateral military alliances. These 
new bilateral alliances would be faced with the same problems that 
the Rio Treaty is faced with, therefore the new agreements would 
similarly need to address categories B, C, and E of the hypothesis 
testing matrix as noted in the previous example. 
agreement technique has the following advantages: 
The bilateral 
-It is constructive, i.e. does not force a country's hand to make a 
drastic change in its defense orientation as the previous option 
does. The country either accepts or rejects the new proposal 
without the fear of being "kicked out" of the existing alliance. 
-It is easier to manage in a diverse region. 
hand picked. Those that have weak or 
establishments would be overlooked. 
Countries would be 
inefficient military 
-It allows the United States to concentrate assets rather than 
spread itself too thin by trying to "prop up" many diverse 
militaries. 
-It avoids the possibility of total collapse inherent III the previous 
option. 
-It could be used to link Latin participation with some sort of 
incentive program such as more favorable agreements on foreign 
military sales from the United States. 
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The Rio treaty should not be totally ignored if this option is 
implemented. Rather it can "remain' in place, not viable militarily, but 
nonetheless, providing a web of contacts which allow open dialogue 
with Latin American navies. 
The obvious first choice of a bilateral partner for this option is 
Brazil for the reasons given in Chapter I. A partnership with Brazil 
could be established on a trial basis, and if successful, another 
country, possibly Argentina could be added at a future date. This 
proposal would not be without its problems, and a few of the more 
obvious are presented below. 
1. Brazil's Capabilities 
Even though Brazil possesses the largest and most capable 
navy of all the signatories, its sea power projection and 
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities are currently inadequate 
to assume a credible position of integrated alliance with the United 
States Navy (see Appendix B for an overview of Brazilian naval 
assets). The antiquated electronics in Brazil's antisubmarine warfare 
S-2 Tracker aircraft squadrons and lack of carrier-based strike and 
fighter aircraft capability limit its utility as a maritime defense 
partner with the United States.65 
Nevertheless, if one were to choose from a list of third world 
navies with regional force projection capability, Brazil, Argentina and 
India would be the only choices available (see Appendix A). The 
65Brazil's only aircraft carrier, the "Minas Gerais" is currently antisubmarine 
warfare capable only, and has no compatible strike or fighter aircraft in its 
airwing. 
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Brazilian navy is actively attempting to upgrade its capability. Plans 
for a nuclear submarine continue, and three IKL-209 (Type 1400) 
class West German submarines are to be built at the Arsenal de 
Marinha do Rio de Janeiro. In 1989 Brazil acquired four Garcia FF-
1040 class frigates and one Thomaston (LSD-28) class dock landing 
ship from the United States. The Brazilian air force is currently in 
the process of re-engining twelve of its Grumman Tracker 
antisubmarine warfare planes with modern turboprop engines.6 6 
Of concern to the Brazilian navy is the continually shrinking 
military budget which has fallen from 1.5% to .3% of the Gross 
National Product (GNP) over the last twenty years.67 The proposed 
1990 budget was .2% of GNP; the lowest in forty years. This makes 
the future of Brazil's naval modernization program uncertain.68 
The United States would probably have to subsidize the 
required' build-up of the Brazilian navy if a credible defense role is 
assigned to Brazil. This subsidy could be in the form of discount 
prices on the sale of equipment, or more favorable lend-lease 
arrangements using mothballed United States ships and aircraft 
which may become available in the event of a United States naval 
force reduction. 
66Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 7, 1991. 
67World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1971-1980, United States 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1983), p. 41; 
World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1989, United States Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1990), p. 39. 
68Robert L. Scheina, "Latin American Navies", U.S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings, March 90, p. 112. 
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2. Brazil's Past Stance on Alliances 
Brazil has demonstrated an aversion to automatic alliances, 
but has indicated that if the need for an alliance ever arose, it would 
occur naturally. At the Center for Brazilian Strategic Studies, Rear 
Admiral Mario Cesar Flores (now Brazil's Minister of the Navy) 
discussed the Brazilian perspective on this issue: 
The association with the North Americans and the West in 
general, in whose strategic camp we will naturally be contained, a 
more sensible participation in the western portion of the South 
Atlantic, should occur naturally at the opportune occasion, not 
seeming to be compulsorily promoted in a formal way in a 
premature epoch.69 
The negative response to President Ronald Reagan's 
suggestion of a military partnership in both the South Atlantic and 
Central America,70 and Brazil's disinterest in establishing a joint-use 
military base on Trindade Island in the South Atlantic 71 is further 
evidence that it is not interested in a joint defense agreement with 
the United States. 
Reasons for Brazilian disinterest may include a lack of 
perceived threat in the area, the distaste of being subordinated to 
the United States in a "junior partner" relationship, the belief that the 
United States will protect the South Atlantic regardless of any 
69Robert J. Branco, The United States and Brazil, (Washington D.C.: National 
Defense University Press, 1984), p. 79. 
70Brazil: A Country Study, p. 282. 
71 Wayne A. Selcher, "Brazil and the Southern Cone", in South America Into the 
1990s, ed., G. Pope Atkins, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p. 117. 
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partnerships, and a wariness of United States' commitment to 
treaties and alliances after 'the Falkland/Malvinas war. 
Not only has Brazil rejected a U.S. proposal for a South 
Atlantic defense coalition, but it rejected a similar proposal from 
Argentina to join with Uruguay and South Africa in a coalition 
defense agreement in 1973. Brazil declined the offer for two 
reasons: an inability to maintain a sizeable battle fleet in the South 
Atlantic, and its non-recognition of Pretoria's apartheid 
governmen t. 72 
The only treaty Brazil has been interested in regarding the 
South Atlantic is one that it cosponsored with Argentina and other 
Latin American and African nations to create a zone of peace and 
cooperation in the area. The proposal was adopted by the United 
Nations in 1986, and attempts to remove Latin America from 
superpower conflict as well as eliminate nuclear weapons in the 
region. 73 
Brazil's averSIOn to automatic alliances may be modified 
under the proper circumstances, such as linking debt reduction or 
p 
discounted military sales to an active role in defense burdensharing. 
Brazilian naval officers have promoted defense of the South Atlantic 
in the past as a possible way to expand their mission74 and 
modernize their navy. There has been cooperation between the 
72Luria, "The Brazilian Armed Forces, Budgets and Ambition Diverge,", p. 933. 
73Roberto Russell, "Argentina: Ten Years of Foreign Policy", in Kelly and 
Child, eds., p. 77. 
74Child, Geopolitics and Conflict, p. 37. 
62 
navies of both the United States and Brazil despite Brazil's stance on 
alliances (See Appendix C for details of that cooperation). It is 
possible therefore, that the Brazilian navy would welcome the idea of 
a defense partnership with the United States, which could be used to 
put pressure on the Brazilian government to alter its aversion to 
automatic alliances. 
A number of geopolitical factors make the desirability of a 
defense partnership with the United States questionable from the 
Brazilian standpoint. A large part of Brazil's rapprochement with 
Argentina was based" on demonstrating independence from the 
United States. Brazil may be unwilling to jeopardize the advances it 
has made by rekindling a junior partner status with the United 
States. 
3. Brazil's Geopolitical Considerations 
Rivalry between Brazil and Argentina has its roots in 
colonial times and arose from trade, border and sphere of influence 
disputes. Although relations have been steadily improving over the 
last decade, an atmosphere of competition is likely to continue for 
some time. The main point of uneasiness rests primarily with 
Argentina's sense of frustration at not achieving what it considered 
to be its destiny of primacy in South America. 
A large source of friction and competition between the two 
countries centers around their relations with "the three so-called 
"buffer states" of Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia. Together, these 
three countries form the La Plata Basin System because they all 
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contain tributaries which empty into the La Plata river. The La Plata 
Basin is an area of geopolitical -competition between Argentina and 
Brazil due to competing desires to monopolize the production of iron 
and energy reserves (coal, petroleum and hydroelectricity).75 
Brazil has made important economic and political inroads to 
these countries in recent years, most significantly in Paraguay with 
mutual cooperation on hydroelectric projects.76 More recent sources 
of Argentine/Brazilian conflict have been Brazil's burgeoning interest 
m portions of Antarctica to which Argentina has already laid claim, 
the -technology race in developing nuclear power, and competition in 
regional markets for their respective arms industries.77 
Finally, a less tangible but no less real source of conflict, is 
the stereotypical views each country holds of the other. The 
Argentine elites are said to have a self perception of racial and 
cultural superiority toward the racially mixed Brazil.78 Brazil, on the 
other hand, from the worst stereotypical perspective, views 
Argentina as a country characterized by political instability, 
haughtiness, lack of discipline, military cruelty, economic stagnation, 
and organizational weakness.1 9 
75Philip Kelly and Jack Child, eds., Geopolitics of the Southern Cone and 
Antarctica, (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988) p. 146. 
76Brazil: A Country Study, p. 280. 
77 Jack Child, Geopolitics in the Southern Cone, (New York: Praeger, 1985), pp. 
98-104. 
78Wayne A. Selcher, "Brazilian-Argentine Relations in the 1980s; From Wary 
Rivalry to Friendly Competition", Journal of lnteramerican Studies and World 
Affairs, Summer 1985, p. 26. 




The "economic miracle" of Brazil during the late 1960's and 
early 1970's contrasted with' the steady decline of Argentina and 
brought about a pragmatic shift of Argentine attitude concerning the 
years old rivalry with Brazil. The idea began to take shape in Buenos 
Aires that Argentina was a second rate power compared to Brazil and 
would remain so unless an atmosphere of cooperation between the 
countries prevailed.8o As political scientist Philip Kelly noted: 
Brazilian-Argentine rivalry has hindered Southern Cone 
integration, created possibilities for serious, indigenous nuclear 
weapons development, jeopardized peaceful settlement of 
disputes in the region intensified competition among Southern 
Cone states for control of the Antarctic, and prevented Brazil from 
distancing itself from the United States. Above all, the cleavage 
between Brazil and Argentina has forestalled a more assertive 
role for the region in world strategic relationships, a checkmating 
effect that has kept the entire area fixed to the global political and 
economic periphery.81 
Rapprochement between Brazil and Argentina began with 
the signing of the Tripartite Agreement on the Corpus-Itaipu 
hydroelectric projects between Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil in 
1979. The change in Argentine governance from a military to 
civilian regime marked a return to a close relationship with 
neighboring Latin American countries . which had been de-
emphasized during the military junta of 1976 to 1983. The foreign 
80Kelly and Child, eds., Geopolitics of the Southern Cone and Antarctica, p. 74. 
81 Kelly and Child, eds., Geopolitics of the Southern Cone and Antarctica , p. 116. 
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policy of the Alfonsin administration centered on the following 
pillars: 
-The consolidation of peace and the discouragement of all types of 
arms races; 
-Opposition to any doctrine which subordinated Latin America to 
the strategic objectives of the superpowers; 
-Promotion of representative government on the continent; 
-Promotion of policies which regionalized problems and their 
solutions; 
-Integration within Latin America.82 
Other examples of rapprochement between Brazil and 
Argentina included agreements in matters of nuclear, technical and 
industrial cooperation. A formal military-industrial agreement 
between the two countries has -not been signed. However, an 
increasing number of bilateral agreements between Brazil and 
Argentina may eventually put an end to their historical rivalry. In 
November 1990, Brazil and Argentina sign~d a nuclear power treaty 
which led President Collor of Brazil to make the following comments 
regarding the significance of the agreement: 
The declaration that we have just signed merits, like few 
others, being termed as historic. It marks the beginning of a new 
phase in our bilateral relations to the nuclear field, creates the 
possibility of joint negotiations with the International Atomic 
82Kelly and Child, eds., Geopolitics of the Southern Cone and Antarctica. p. 85. 
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Energy Agency [IAEA], and IS a step toward the signing of the 
Tlatelolco Treaty. 83 
Both countries are reportedly working together on the 
development of fast breeder reactors. Brazilian President Jose 
Sarney's visit to the Argentine uranium enrichment plant in July 
1987 led to speculation that the two countries would eventually 
team up in their plans to develop nuclear submarines. Indeed, the 
astronomical expense and high risk of such a program seems to lend 
itself to an international partnership.84 
Despite the current atmosphere of cooperation in the 
Southern Cone, both countries are aware that old rivalries could be 
rekindled in Antarctica or the South Atlantic. Both of these regions 
have been in dispute by several different countries for a number of 
years. 85 The discovery of oil or valuable minerals in these areas 
could easily stoke quietly smoldering rivalries into a flare up. 
Brazil's culture, size, fascination with the United States, 
geopolitical rivalries and distances of major population centers from 
Spanish Latin America are factors which have separated it from 
neighboring countries. These factors are seen as having been 
detrimental to Brazil's ability to project influence, and its ability to 
become integrated within Latin America. 
83"Collor Address on Treaty With Argentina," (in Portuguese), Folha de Sao 
Paulo, 29 Nov 90, p. A 6, translated and reported in FIBIS LAT-90-236, 7 
December 1990, p. 28. 
84Eduardo Italo Pesce, "Brazil's Silent Service", U.S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings, March 1989, p. 66. 
85 Among them, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Great Britain, and many other 
countries, both developed and undeveloped worldwide. 
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In March of 1977, Brazil refused $60 million dollars of U.S. 
military aid which was linked to human rights Issues. It also 
denounced the Interamerican Treaty of Mutual Assistance, and 
expelled the U.S. naval mission.86 This was not merely a response to 
an isolated incident. It was also a signal to the rest of Latin America 
that Brazil wanted to end the perception of being a U.S. proxy so that 
integration with its neighbors would be facilitated. Brazil recognizes 
that its latitude in the western hemisphere can be ultimately 
restricted by pressure from Washington if United States security 
. interests are threatened. It is therefore to Brazil's advantage to 
resist close political or military identification with the United States. 
Both Argentine and Chilean geopolitical thinking have a 
strong maritime component with their interests in southern passages, 
the Malvinas, and Antarctica. A joint naval partnership between 
Brazil and the United States could be viewed as being threatening to 
Argentina's national interest. Argentina may fear the partnership 
would replace its current rivalry against Chile and Brazil with a new 
rivalry against Chile, Brazil and the United States. This would not be 
• 
conducive to southern cone integration. Brazil has rejected the idea 
of a joint military partnership with the United States in the past, and 
may do so in the future as long as southern cone integration remains 
a keystone to its national interest. 
86Robert L. Scheina. Latin America, a Naval History 1810-1987. (Annapolis: 
Naval Institute Press. 1987) pp. 171. 172. 
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On the other hand, if Argentina did see its national interest 
jeopardized with the formation of a Brazil, U.S. and defacto Chilean 
alliance, a possible solution to this would be to include Argentina in 
the partnership as well. After all, Argentina envisioned the idea of 
the South Atlantic Treaty Organization (see Chapter III), to which 
Brazil declined membership because of political considerations and 
constraints in naval resources. The navies of each country do not 
seem to have a problem with geopolitical rivalry as demonstrated by 
their willingness to cooperate on their yearly maritime exercise 
"Fraterno" . 
Argentina might also see a benefit of being linked to the 
United States in a maritime capacity to protect its interests with 
regard to Chile and its claims in Antarctica. This would no doubt 
upset the Chileans who regard their Brazilian connection as 
important for countering Argentina. The Brazil/Chile connection 
however is informal and therefore does not represent a vital interest 
to Brazil. Brazil may agree to include Argentina in the defense 
partnership for this reason. 
4. Problematic V.S./Brazilian Bilateral Issues 
There are several bilateral issues between the United States 
and Brazil that represent diverging objectives and may make a 
military alliance tenuous; 
a. Debt and Trade 
Brazil put a moratorium on its debt servicing in 1987, 
but announced plans to partially lift the moratorium in December 
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1990. For the first three months of 1991, Brazil plans to pay 30 
percent of the interest from- its :$63 billion private bank debt. Total 
interest arrears to commercial banks now total $8.3 billion. 8 7 
If Brazil were unable to surmount its massive debt 
problems which have thus far shown no signs of real recovery, the 
economic impact would reverberate throughout the world system. 
Compounding these problems are heavy debt servicing, rising costs 
for many of Brazil's imports, northern protectionism against its 
exports and a falling demand for its products.8 8 
In addition to debt problems creating friction between 
the United States and Brazil, trade imbalances have also contributed 
to economic problems between the two countries. In 1989 there was 
a $4.2 billion trade imbalance between the United States and Brazil 
in Brazil's favor.89 
b. Security 
Brazil's military industrial complex has sold weapons to 
regimes hostile to the United States such as Iraq, Libya and Iran. On 
a number of occasions, protests by the United States have resulted In 
modifications of this policy. 
The primary Issue of conflict is Brazil's insistence of 
acquiring ballistic missiles and related technology. The United States 
87Christina Lamb, "Brazil will 'partially lift' Moratorium", Financial Times of 
London, December 19, 1990. 
88Abraham Lowenthal, "Rethinking US Interests in the Western Hemisphere", 
Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, vol 29, Spring 1987, pp. 10, 
11. 
89"Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook", International Monetary Fund, 
Publication Services, Washington, D.C., 1990, p. 403. 
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is concerned that Brazil may have nuclear warhead and delivery 
capability by the year 2000. Both Brazilian Foreign Minister 
Francisco Rezek and National Commission of Nuclear Energy 
president Jose Luiz de Carvalho Santana have denied that Brazil 
would use nuclear technology for military purposes. Both refused to 
comment on a recent report released by the Carnegie Foundation for 
International Peace in Washington D.C. that Brazil and Argentina 
smuggled technology from West Germany to expand their nuclear 
weapons capabilities. 90 Both Brazil and Argentina formally 
renounced the manufacture of nuclear weaponry just prior to 
president Bush's South American visit in November 1990. Both 
countries however have yet to announce intentions to abide by 
either the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco, two regimes aimed at keeping Latin America free of 
atomic weapons.91 The United States has restricted its technology to 
Brazil under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). 
Members of the MTCR include the United States, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Britain, Sweden and Switzerland (the MTCR 
does not include the Soviet Union and China). 
Brazil has gone to both France and Germany for missile 
technology under the guise of acquiring space systems technology. 
Although they are MTCR members, France and Germany do not 
90Executive News Services, APn 04/17 2213. Brazil-Nuclear. The Associated 
Press. 1990. 
91 Shirly Christian, "Argentina and Brazil Renounce Atomic Weapons". The 
New York Times. 29 November 1990. 
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associate space programs with ballistic missile programs to the same 
extent· that the United States does. France has given Brazil dated 
rocket launching technology. 
Chinese missiles use different rocket propellants than 
those the Brazilians are planning to acquire, and the Soviet Union so 
far has not shown interest in sharing its missile technology with 
BraziI.92 
c. Theft of Intellectual Property Rights 
The United States has accused Brazil of making products 
and profits (mostly in the ,pharmaceutical and computer industries) 
from pirated United States technology and giving the United States 
nothing in return. As punishment, Washington placed Brazil on the 
Intellectual Property Rights Watch List and imposed 100% tariffs on 
Brazilian paper products, drugs and electronics items although such 
measures were contrary to the rules of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Within the GATT framework, service and 
intellectual property rights are not recognized as having legal 
ownership. 
d. The Amazon Issue 
Most industrialized countries, as well as the W orId Bank 
and International Development Bank are pressuring Brazil to cease 
its deforestation of the Amazon. So far, 5% of the jungle has been 
92Scott D. Tollefson, "Brazil, the United States, and the Missile Technology 
Control Regime". NPS-56-90-006, paper prepared for the Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, Ca., March 1990, p. 82. 
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deforested and m December of 1988, Chico Mendez, a leading 
crusader against Amazon development, was killed by developers. 
President Jose Sarney's (1985-1990) initial response to 
anti-development pressure was antagonistic, proclaiming that "no 
one has the right to tell Brazil how to run its country." He later 
softened his rhetoric and instituted several measures which included 
suspending tax incentives and banning timber exports as preliminary 
measures to discourage development of the Amazon Basin. 
Current president Fernando Collor de Mello has made 
environmental reform a major goal. He is enforcing.a federal court 
order banning miners from the Amazon basin, instituted in October 
of 1989. Following a helicopter flight over the area, Collor ordered 
several crude landing strips blown up to prevent the illegal entry of 
miners on federally protected lands.93 The rain forest continues to 
be cut down despite these moves. Further destruction of the rain 
forest could aggravate relations between the United States and Brazil 
to the point that congressional support for a bilateral defense 
partnership could be hampered. 
e. General Agreements 
Brazil has shown a distinct preference for going its 
separate way to achieve its own interests on such matters as trade 
relations and international agreements. Brazil's dependence on 
Middle Eastern petroleum which began in the 1970s, has driven a 
wedge between it and the United States on the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
93"Blowup in the Rain Forest", Time, April 90, p. 59. 
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and has led Brazil to develop ties with various Arab countries, some 
hostile to the United States.94 Additionally, Brazil no longer 
automatically supports the United States on international issues. In 
the 1985 session of the United Nations General Assembly, Brazil was 
among three Latin American countries that voted with the United 
States the least number of times (less than 16%).95 
From the standpoint of many Latin Americans, the 
deforestation and arms sales issues should be of no concern to the 
"Yankees." The deforestation issue is regarded as an example of the 
Yankees applying a dual- set of standards to the problem. The United 
States "raped" its own countryside, but now takes a condescending 
and paternalistic VIew of the Latin Americans when they do the 
same thing. 
The remaining issues have come about as a result of U.S. 
involvement in Latin affairs. To the problem of debt, a common 
Latin American explanation heard is that the United States caused 
the debt by offering loans with unrealistically low interest rates. The 
drug supply problem is seen not as a Latin American problem of 
r 
supply, but as a North American problem of demand. To the arms 
transfer problem, many Latin Americans would argue that 
Washington has also sold weapons to countries which have later 
become hostile to the United States. 
94Lowenthal. "Rethinking US Interests in the Western Hemisphere", p. 6. 





Although these issues are of concern inasmuch as they affect 
relations between the governments of both countries, they seem to 
be getting less important. Initiatives have been taken on both sides 
to try to reduce the problems, such as President Bush's Enterprise for 
the Americas Initiative, which is aimed at forming a western 
hemispheric free trade zone that may in turn help to alleviate 
Brazilian debt. Recent statements by President Collor indicate 
Brazilian support for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In 
addition, there has been some progress made on the deforestation 
issue. 
These issues have had some effect on navy to navy relations as 
demonstrated by the lack of Maritime Interest Papers between Brazil 
and the United States. Maritime Interest Papers (also called Common 
Strategic Consideration papers) are currently in place between the 
United States and Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay 
and Venezuela. These papers allow navy to navy operations to take 
place without government involvement. The U.S. State Department 
disapproved the signing of Maritime Interest Papers due to problems 
with Brazilian trade practices in the 1980s. These trade problems 
have been partially rectified. However, there are still no Maritime 
Interest Papers in place between Brazil and the United States.96 
Notwithstanding, the Brazilian military seems to have less of an 
aversion to bilateral accords than the government does, as evidenced 
96These papers have not been signed as of February 1991. 
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by an increasing number of naval bilateral initiatives over the last 
ten years (See Appendix C). 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Latin America and the United States do have defense 
agreements in place in the form of the Organization of American 
States and the Rio Treaty, but they are no longer viable for defense 
of the hemisphere due to conflicting goals and vaguely written rules 
of operational commitment on the part of the signatories. The 
decline of the Soviet Union has removed what little threat there was 
to the area. Even in its prime, Soviet naval deployments (and 
parallel U.S. naval deployments) to the South Atlantic were few and 
far between. If the South Atlantic's strategic importance increases 
due to possible closure of the Suez and Panama Canals in time of 
hostility, then naval assets should be positioned to protect those 
areas vice positioning them in the South Atlantic. In peacetime, the 
South Atlantic is of primary importance for commerce, but of 
secondary importance strategically. 
The possibility of a country within the Western hemisphere 
coming under massive attack from outside forces is remote at the 
present time. It is more likely that threats to the hemisphere will 
either originate within the hemisphere, or will arrive in the form of 
economic reverberations from some overseas world actor. Threats 
within the hemisphere include political terrorism, narco-trafficking, 
narco-terrorism and insurgency. The 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
is an example of extra hemispheric threat which has produced both 
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economic reverberations and balance of power concerns throughout 
the global community. 
These types of threats have been present for a number of years, 
but have been overshadowed to some extent by the cold war. The 
Rio Treaty was designed for the cold war, and where its utility was 
questionable for the last forty three years, it now seems obviously 
inappropriate for these new threats. The 1990 Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait provides an example of Latin American threat perception. 
Several NATO signatories, though they have undergone the same 
threat reduction problem, mustered some fifty two ships in and 
around the Persian Gulf in response to the Middle East crisis. Of the 
Rio Treaty signatories, only Argentina provided two ships for 
logistical support.97 
Of the three options mentioned previously; do nothing, revitalize 
the Rio Treaty, or keep the Treaty and add bilateral agreements, 
adding bilateral agreements is the best course of action. In order for 
these bilateral agreements to be worthwhile, the casus foederis must 
be expanded from the current Rio Treaty definition to include a 
wider range of threat catalysts. The catalysts should include specific 
instructions on expected force participation in the event of the 
following challenges to U.S ./Brazilian interests: 
97This observation is not meant to compare NATO and IATRA. Both the NATO 
signatories and Argentina are acting outside of their respective treaties. Even 
outside of their treaties however, there is a fundamental difference between 
N A TO and IA TRA in threat perception and willingness to commit forces. 
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-attack on either signatory by any aggressor; 
-extra hemispheric threat, either military or economic; 
-terrorism or insurgency of any kind; and 
-narco-trafficking. 
Brazilian naval power projection capabilities and force 
integration should be enhanced with an emphasis on those 
capabilities that best complement U.S. Navy capabilities after budget 
cuts are implemented. Subsidies and incentives to Brazil could 
include preferred customer status for lend lease and foreign military 
sales, co-development agreements on future weapons systems, and 
favorable trading partner status. 
Forming a well trained, integrated alliance with a relatively 
small number of capable navies would provide an alternative to the 
Rio Treaty. Focused partnerships would be easier to manage, and 
could be relied upon more than the current weak alliance which pays 
only lip service to the idea of hemispheric defense. Brazil, with its 
capability, and historical ties to the United States as a World War II 
ally is the obvious choice for forming a maritime partnership. Once 
in place and operating smoothly, other capable and willing countries 
could be added to the coalition. 
Bilateral partnerships should not totally replace the Rio Treaty_ 
The Treaty should be left in place to provide a vehicle for dialogue 
between countries that are interested. The newly formed bilateral 
partnerships could assume more of a defense burden by virtue of 
their increased capability, operability and available incentives. 
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A bilateral agreement between Brazil and the United States may 
initially cause tension in countries such as Argentina, particularly if 
Brazil benefits by increasing its maritime potential. Argentina may 
request inclusion In such an arrangement, and this could be 
beneficial to all three countries. It should be noted that Argentina, 
though it possesses less naval capability than Brazil, sent two ships to 
the Persian Gulf in support of operation "Desert Storm," where Brazil 
sent none. 
Other problems previously mentioned such as geopolitical 
considerations and stances on alliances are strictly up to the 
Brazilians to resolve or negotiate. All the United States can do is 
present the proposal, be as sensitive to Brazilian concerns as possible 
and accept the outcome. 
" 
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APPENDIX A--RANKING OF THIRD WORLD NAVIES 
Categories of Third- Naval capabilities States in each rank 
World navies I(alphabetical order) 
6. Regional force Impressive territorial Argentina. Brazil. India 
projection navies defense capabilities and 
some ability to project 
force in the adjoining 
ocean basin 
5. Adjacent force Impressive territorial Chile. Iran. North Korea, 
projection navies defence capabilities and Peru, South Korea 
some ability to project 
force well offshore 
(bevond the EEZ) 
4. Offshore territorial Considerable offshore Colombia, Egypt, 
defense navies territorial defense Indonesia, Libya, 
capabilities up to EEZ Mexico, Pakistan, 
limits Philippines, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Venezuela 
3. Inshore territorial Primarily inshore Bangladesh, Burma, 
defense navies territorial defense with Cuba, Dominican 
limited offshore defense Republic, Ecuador, 
capability Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Malaysia. Nigeria, South 
Africa,98 Syria, 
Uruguay Vietnam 
2. Constabulary navies Some ability to prevent Algeria, Gabon, Guinea, 
use of coastal waters, Iraq, Guinea-Bissau, 
with concentration on North Yemen, Oman, 
constabulary functions Saudi Arabia, Singapore, 
Somalia, South Yemen, 
Tanzania 
1. Token navies Unable even to patrol 62 remaining navies 
national territorial seas 
effecti vely. Impotent in 
the EEZ 
Source: Michael A. Morris, Expansion of Third World Navies (London: 
MacMillan Press, 1987) pp. 25, 26. 
98Morris does not consider South Africa a third world country. 
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APPENDIX B--THE BRAZILIAN NAVAL INVENTORY 
Submarines: 
Number Type Acquired Weapons 
From/Original 
Name 
1 Tupi FRG/(T- Tigerfish Torp 
209/1400) 
3 Humaita UK/Oberon Tigerfish Torp 
3 Goias/Bahia US/Guppy Tigerfish Torp 
III/II 
Appendix B Continued next page .... 
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Appendix B (continued from previous page) 
Principal Surface Combatants: 
Missio n Number Type Acquir'd Weapons Aircraft 
FromtOri-
iginal Name 
Carrier 1 Minas Gerais UK! Colossus Airwing 7-8 S-2E, 8 
(ASW) ASH-3H 
Destroyer 2 MarcHio Dias US! Gearing ASRO, ASTT, 1 Wasp Helo 
(ASW) 127 mm guns (Mk 46 
Torpedo) 
Destroyer 5 Mato Grosso US! ASTT, 127 4 with Wasp 
(ASW) mm guns helo 
Sumner (Mk 46 Toml 
Destroyer 2 Piaui US! ASTT, 127 none 
mm, 533 
Fletcher mmTT 
Frigate 4 Niteroi Brazilian ASTT, Ikara 1 Lynx Helo 
(ASW) SUGW,ASW 
mor, 2 Exocet 
SSM, 114 mm 
Gun 
Frigate 2 Niteroi Brazilian Weapons as 1 Lynx Helo 
(GP) ASW except 
4 Exocet, no 
Ikara 
Frigate 1 Inhauma Brazilian ASRR,4 1 Lynx Helo 
Exocet, 114 
mm Gun 
Patrol! 9 Imperial Brazilian 
Coastal Marin-heiro 
pca 
Patrol! 6 Piratini US/PGM 
Coastal 
Patrol/ 2 Riverine 
Coastal Patrol 
Mine Warfare 6 Aratu FRGt Schutze 
Amphib 1 (600 troop Duque de US de Soto 
capacity) Caxais County) 
Amphib 1 (200 Troop D'Avila US/LST-511 
Capacity) 
Amphib 3 LCU, 3 
LCM,30 
LCVP 
Appendix B Continued next page .... 
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Appendix B (Continued from previous page) 
Support and Miscellaneous Ships: 
1 Marajo AOE, 1 repair . ship, 4 tpt, 5 survey/oceanography, 1 mod 
Niteroi FF (trg), 5 ocean tugs 
Naval Air Force: 
ASW: 1 helicopter squadron with 10 ASH-3H 
ATTACK: 1 Squadron with 8 Lynx Has 21, 1 with 8 AS-350 (armed), 
7 Wasp HAS-, 3 HB-315. 
Utility: 1 squadron with 3 AS-332 
Training: 1 helo Squadron with 10 TH-57 
Air Force Maritime Command: 
4 Gp (22 combat aircraft) 
ASW afloat: 1 squadron with 12 S-2E 
MR/SAR: 4 Squadrons with 14 EMB-II0B, 10 EMB-ll1, 8 UH-ID 
armed 
Bases 
Ocean: Rio de Janeiro (HQ I Naval District, Salvasor (HQ II District), 
Natal (HQ III District I, Belem (HQ IV District), Rio Grande (do suI) 
(HQ V District) Ladario (HQ VI District) 
Riverine: Manaus, Corumba 
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 
1989, 1990 (Brassey's, 1989) p. 185. 
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APPENDIX C··JOINT U.S.lBRAZILIAN NA VAL INITIATIVES 
REGULAR PARTICIPANT IN UNITAS 
-Brazilian Phase of UNITAS XXX/89 was first ever quadrilateral 
phase. Included U.S./Brazil/Uruguay/Argentina 
-Has participated in Phase Zero on many occasions 
OTHER OPERATIONS/EXERCISES 
-Brazilian navy hosts annual naval control of shipping exercise 
(Participates in USN Exercises) 
-Participant in annual inter-American war game 
-USN P-3 Crew to participate in exhange with Brazilian air force 
-Brazilian navy participated in FLEETEX 1-89 
CARRIER INTERFLEET TRANSFERS 
-Participated in PASSEX's with several U.S. Navy aircraft carriers 
Appendix C continued next page .... 
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Appendix C (Contined from previous page) 
SECURITY ASSISTANCE 
-Pour Garcia Class Prigates transferred 1989 
-Thomaston Class LST Transferred 1989 
-SECDEP has approved offer of transfer of four Adams class DDG's 
(1991-2) 
-Brazilan navy has purchased upgraded torpedoes 
-May purchase SH-2P's from Kaman 
-LOA signed to purchase ex-USNS Sands, hydrographic survey vessel, 
upon expiration of current lease 
AGREEMENTS 
-Cooperative project between ONR and Brazilian naval directorate of 
hydrography and navigation 
-Conducting geophysical/oceanographic investigations (ongoing 
project since 1980) 
HIGH LEVEL VISITS 
-VADM Nyquist represented SECNAV at Dec 1989 Brazilian Navy Day 
r 
celebration in Rio marking the arrival of foul Garcia class frigates 
-Several additional visits between high level U.S . Naval officers and 
their counterparts from BRAZNA V 
Appendix C Continued next page .... 
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Appendix C (Continued from previous page) 
PERSONNEL EXCHANGES 
-Four USN/BRAZNAV officers participating In personnel exchange 
program 
-Naval War College exchange 
-Brazilian naval officers attending Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey 
-BRAZNA V has liason officer assigned to CINCLANTFLT staff 
. -USN SEALS periodically attend Brazilian army jungle warfare course 
-Foreign exchange and training of midshipmen 
-USN Ensign participates in BRAZNAV training cruise 
MISCELLANEOUS 
-Member of Inter-American naval telecommunications network 
-USN mine warfare experts visited Brazilian navy counterparts June 
90 
-USN experts observed Brazilian navy close-in weapon system 
currently under development 
. -CINLANTFL T intelligence exchange 
Source: Briefing by Captain Patrick Roth and CDR John G. Karas USN, Western 
Hemisphere Branch, Politico-Military Policy and Current Plans Division of op-
06, at U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca., 9 Sep 1990 
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